The column below has been reproduced from the Guardian newspaper with the permission of the author.
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| Dr Hamid Ghany |
The address by President George Maxwell Richards at the ceremonial opening of Parliament last Wednesday bore more of a resemblance to that of a State of the Union address given by an executive president than it did to a quasi-ceremonial president in a system of government where political responsibility for policy matters rests with ministers.
The address included reaffirmations about his political neutrality, his ceremonial role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, his desire for constitutional reform to accomplish an independent Parliament, and the promotion of meritocracy as a yardstick for employment.
Ever since we became a republic in 1976, the Office of the President has moved away from the mannerisms of the governor-general, yet the yearning to preserve the impartiality of the Crown that it once served remain as pangs of hunger for a politically-neutral institution that has since become mired in political controversy by virtue of the collection of controversies that some of its previous holders have put it through.
The President has to appreciate that people’s perceptions are their reality and in the same way that he would want to berate the politicians on all sides of the House and in different administrations about their conduct in office, he, too, has had his own challenges.
His failure to properly handle the Integrity Commission fiasco of May 2009 has caused untold damage to the institution in its aftermath and there were no politicians involved in that process as it was all of his own doing. His example there ought not to be emulated by future presidents.
The reality is that our presidency is one that does not bear any political responsibility for any actions or decisions made by the holder of the office. Cabinet is collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament and ministers are individually responsible and answerable to Parliament. The President is insulated from all of this, but our political culture must find a way to make the holder of the office accountable for personal errors.
There was an attempt to transfer the British constitutional doctrine that “the Queen can do no wrong” to our constitution. However, we do not have a tradition of royalty and nobility so that the courts must be able to state whether the holder of the office of president has erred in cases where he exercises his own discretion. In cases where he acts on advice, this will be covered by the fact that there is political responsibility attaching to the people or authorities tendering the advice.
The screams for constitutional reform (be they presidential or plebeian) get an antidote from a society that is wedded to the Westminster-Whitehall tradition and there is a collective desire to criticise the constitutional arrangements that co-exist with a collective desire to retain them.
The political paralysis that emerges will explain why term limits and fixed dates for elections are deemed desirable, but not the rest of the presidential package that involves a legislature that is independent of the executive branch of government.
Some people want piecemeal changes to the existing Constitution in the hope that we can perfect what we already have, while others want deeper reforms in the hope that power may be shared institutionally rather than personally.
The address included reaffirmations about his political neutrality, his ceremonial role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, his desire for constitutional reform to accomplish an independent Parliament, and the promotion of meritocracy as a yardstick for employment.
Ever since we became a republic in 1976, the Office of the President has moved away from the mannerisms of the governor-general, yet the yearning to preserve the impartiality of the Crown that it once served remain as pangs of hunger for a politically-neutral institution that has since become mired in political controversy by virtue of the collection of controversies that some of its previous holders have put it through.
The President has to appreciate that people’s perceptions are their reality and in the same way that he would want to berate the politicians on all sides of the House and in different administrations about their conduct in office, he, too, has had his own challenges.
His failure to properly handle the Integrity Commission fiasco of May 2009 has caused untold damage to the institution in its aftermath and there were no politicians involved in that process as it was all of his own doing. His example there ought not to be emulated by future presidents.
The reality is that our presidency is one that does not bear any political responsibility for any actions or decisions made by the holder of the office. Cabinet is collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament and ministers are individually responsible and answerable to Parliament. The President is insulated from all of this, but our political culture must find a way to make the holder of the office accountable for personal errors.
There was an attempt to transfer the British constitutional doctrine that “the Queen can do no wrong” to our constitution. However, we do not have a tradition of royalty and nobility so that the courts must be able to state whether the holder of the office of president has erred in cases where he exercises his own discretion. In cases where he acts on advice, this will be covered by the fact that there is political responsibility attaching to the people or authorities tendering the advice.
The screams for constitutional reform (be they presidential or plebeian) get an antidote from a society that is wedded to the Westminster-Whitehall tradition and there is a collective desire to criticise the constitutional arrangements that co-exist with a collective desire to retain them.
The political paralysis that emerges will explain why term limits and fixed dates for elections are deemed desirable, but not the rest of the presidential package that involves a legislature that is independent of the executive branch of government.
Some people want piecemeal changes to the existing Constitution in the hope that we can perfect what we already have, while others want deeper reforms in the hope that power may be shared institutionally rather than personally.
The most fundamental aspect of President Richards’ address last Wednesday was his desire for an independent Parliament. That can only be accomplished by a fundamental constitutional change in the direction of presidentialism.
Unfortunately, the examples of presidentialism that are used in debates in our society are those of Latin America and never those of the United States of America.
We have tried to introduce presidential mechanisms into our republican constitution in the reforms on the Police Service whereby the President nominates and the House of Representatives confirms or rejects those nominees for police commissioner, deputy commissioner and the Police Service Commission. We have introduced departmental select committees to oversee various agencies of government that attempt to resemble Washington-style congressional committees in their functioning.
However, the basic core of our constitutional arrangements is that the Cabinet dominates the Parliament. The need for the Cabinet to enjoy the support of a majority that is based on political loyalty will always mean that the Parliament cannot be “independent” in the way that President Richards would like to see it. Yet, his call is one that must not be ignored as he seemed to be searching for a way to make Parliament a more meaningful institution.
The need for an Opposition is based on a Westminster-Whitehall mindset that the only way to check a government is to have an official opposition. Presidential systems of government permit power-sharing based on control of different branches of government by different political parties so that the phenomenon called “the Opposition” does not exist, but rather you have majority and minority leaders in different houses of the legislature which are separate from the president and can be of different political persuasions.
These majority leaders can become alternative poles of power in competition with a president to influence policy and legislation by compromise and not domination. How we elect them is another story.
We have tried to introduce presidential mechanisms into our republican constitution in the reforms on the Police Service whereby the President nominates and the House of Representatives confirms or rejects those nominees for police commissioner, deputy commissioner and the Police Service Commission. We have introduced departmental select committees to oversee various agencies of government that attempt to resemble Washington-style congressional committees in their functioning.
However, the basic core of our constitutional arrangements is that the Cabinet dominates the Parliament. The need for the Cabinet to enjoy the support of a majority that is based on political loyalty will always mean that the Parliament cannot be “independent” in the way that President Richards would like to see it. Yet, his call is one that must not be ignored as he seemed to be searching for a way to make Parliament a more meaningful institution.
The need for an Opposition is based on a Westminster-Whitehall mindset that the only way to check a government is to have an official opposition. Presidential systems of government permit power-sharing based on control of different branches of government by different political parties so that the phenomenon called “the Opposition” does not exist, but rather you have majority and minority leaders in different houses of the legislature which are separate from the president and can be of different political persuasions.
These majority leaders can become alternative poles of power in competition with a president to influence policy and legislation by compromise and not domination. How we elect them is another story.
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