Guest column - Expounding on the role of MPs by Dr Hamid Ghany

As the issue of constitutional reform continues to attract much public interest and debate, one of the fundamental areas of debate that is emerging is the role of the individual Member of Parliament as a constituency representative. 

This matter continues to gain attention as people really would like to see their MPs functioning as a CEO of their constituency in respect of the provision of goods and services. 

The reality is, however, that this is not so. 

Individual MPs do not have a budget for their constituencies and they are really there to provide “representation” as opposed to “management”. However, there appears to be a disconnect between the expectations of people and the measurement of performance of their MPs. 

There are many people who genuinely believe that in a parliamentary system that the MP can make things happen because there is some direct control of resources to make things happen, when the truth is that the MP is at the mercy of ministries, government departments, agencies and regional corporations.

Those MPs who happen to be Ministers are perhaps better placed than other MPs who do not hold any positions in the executive branch of Government. 

The performance of the MP in many instances is measured in the public domain by the number of times the MP for an area can have his/her activities publicised in the media as opposed to those who are not fortunate to have such coverage. 

There are many MPs on both sides of the House who keep their office hours religiously for their constituents, but they do not have media coverage to go with it. 

Perhaps, one of the keys to this puzzle is the issue of visibility as many members of the public are usually quite quick to say that they have never seen their MP since the election campaign. 

This ought not to be too difficult for MPs to arrange, as an outreach programme in their constituencies can bear fruit. Where they will have difficulty is in instances where there is little or no delivery of goods and services at the request of the MP.

Those MPs who are Ministers will tend to have a more difficult time as they have to balance their ministerial time with their time in the Parliament and their time in the constituency. 

There has been much talk about the introduction of the North American technique of the right of recall. In seeking to introduce a Washington-model technique into a Westminster-adapted system there will be problems that need to be addressed. 

The first of these is the fact that the MP is usually chosen by the party when standing for election as a candidate. In the United States, where this model is most likely being copied from, most state representatives run in primary elections and their candidacy is a function of winning the support of registered voters within their parties. This allows them some measure of independence after they get elected to put the issues of their districts ahead of their parties.

That is not how this will work if this reform is introduced here. The MP will be expected to toe the party line, once elected, and if he/she deviates from that directive, then a recall mechanism can be activated against them. 

It should also be noted that trade unions will be able to use this against Ministers who are involved in negotiations with their ministries and opposing parties can use it in order to get a second bite at the proverbial cherry. 

If this mechanism is to function in a manner that is fair to all sides, then there has to be a clear separation between the MP and his/her ability to be appointed a Minister. 

If this does not happen, then those MPs who are also Ministers may find that their political enemies will use it as a tool to destabilise the Government. This is so because in a parliamentary system the executive functions on the basis of majority control and dominance of Parliament.

In the presidential-style system from where this is being copied, the administration of a state governor will not fall if there are several district representatives who are removed by way of recall. 

In seeking to establish a greater separation between elected MPs and the possibility of ministerial appointments arising therefrom, there will have to be some embrace, whether directly, gradually or on a hybrid basis, of "presidentialism". 

This can still be accomplished if the titles of the Prime Minister and Ministers are to be kept. However, ministers may have to be chosen from outside the House of Representatives if the desire is to have the MP serve only as a constituency representative and parliamentarian and not as a Minister in the executive branch. 

That kind of constitutional change will beg the question about the next step being a modified presidential one even if it is not called by that name. But, if people want their MPs to serve them alone and not the party or the Government, then the choices are limited.

The above column was reproduced from the Guardian with persmission of the author.